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Abstract. We show that Carmo and Jones’ condition 5(e) conflicts with the other
conditions on their models for contrary-to-duty obligations. We then propose a resolution
to the conflict.
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We shall point out a conflict between some semantic conditions proposed
by Carmo and Jones [1, 2, 3] in the area of contrary-to-duty obligations
in deontic logic. Then, we shall propose a resolution of the conflict. For
a comprehensive treatment of contrary-to-duty obligations, introduced by
Chisholm [5], one may consult [10].
1. The conflict
Let W be the set of possible worlds of a given model, and let P denote
the power set operation. Carmo and Jones1 give the following conditions
(whose numbering we retain) on a function ob : P(W )→ P(P(W )) picking
out that which is obligatory in a given context.
5(a) ∅ 6∈ ob(X).
5(b) If Y ∩X = Z ∩X then Y ∈ ob(X) iff Z ∈ ob(X).
5(c) If Y ∈ ob(X) and Z ∈ ob(X) then Y ∩ Z ∈ ob(X).
5(d) If Y ⊆ X and Y ∈ ob(X) and X ⊆ Z, then (Z \X) ∪ Y ∈ ob(Z).
5(e) If Y ⊆ X and Z ∈ ob(X) and Y ∩ Z 6= ∅, then Z ∈ ob(Y ).
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1Conditions 5(a)–(d) and 5(e) are first introduced on pages 331 and 341, respectively,
of [1], where ob is called pi. 5(a)–(d) are also given in [2], page 291, with 5(e) on page
319. The conditions 5(a)(b)(d)(e) and a condition (c∗) are given in [3], page 590.
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We shall now show how these conditions, in particular 5(d) and 5(e), are
inherently in conflict with each other.
Definition 1.1. Suppose X and Y are subsets of W . We say that X and
Y are mutually generic, or in general position, if all the four sets
X ∩ Y, X \ Y, Y \X, W \ (X ∪ Y )
are nonempty. Let A and B be propositions. Let ‖A‖ be the set of worlds
in which A is true. We say that A and B are mutually generic if ‖A‖ and
‖B‖ are mutually generic sets.
Theorem 1.2. Suppose A and B are mutually generic propositions, and ob
satisfies conditions 5(b), 5(d), and 5(e). Then
‖A‖ ∈ ob(‖⊤‖) =⇒ ‖B‖ ∈ ob(‖¬A‖).
Proof. Using ‖A ∨ ¬(A ∨ ¬B)‖ = ‖A ∨B‖, we deduce:
‖A‖ ∈ ob(‖⊤‖) (hypothesis)
‖A‖ ∈ ob(‖A ∨ ¬B‖) (by 5(e))
‖A ∨ ¬(A ∨ ¬B)‖ ∈ ob(‖⊤‖) (by 5(d))
‖A ∨B‖ ∈ ob(‖⊤‖)
‖A ∨B‖ ∈ ob(‖¬A‖) (by 5(e))
‖B‖ ∈ ob(‖¬A‖) (by 5(b))
The conclusion in Theorem 1.2 is patently absurd. Just because A was
obligatory initially, why would we upon violation of A have a contrary-to-
duty obligation that B, without any further information about B?
The argument just given is a refinement of a twenty-year-old one [6] The
latter is summarized in [2, footnote 28]. Carmo and Jones responded to [6]
in [2]. They argued that condition 5(c) should be weakened [2, p. 323]. In-
deed, doing so takes care of the problem pointed out in [6], but the argument
in Theorem 1.2 above makes no use of 5(c).
Carmo and Jones did see some potential for problems with the com-
bination of just 5(b), (d), and (e) [2, pp. 319–320 and Figure 1]. However,
in the end they kept all three conditions for the system studied in [3].
If our aim were mostly destructive, then we could perhaps end this paper
here. Instead, we shall now outline a possible constructive response.
A conflict between some semantic conditions of Carmo and Jones 3
2. A resolution of the conflict
On our reading of Carmo and Jones, their conditions 5(d) and 5(e) belong
to two distinct approaches.
Both approaches start with a simpler function F : P(W ) → P(W )
which picks out the ideal worlds in a given context. According to the first
approach, we then let
ob(X) = {Y : Y ⊇ F (X)}. (I)
Thus, any sufficiently unrestrictive proposition will be obligatory.
In the second approach, we let
ob(X) = {Y : Y ∩X = F (X)}. (II)
Thus, there is essentially only one obligatory proposition in a given context.
In both cases, we assume
F (X) ⊆ X (III)
and
X 6= ∅ =⇒ F (X) 6= ∅. (IV)
For (I), we consider the following two additional conditions. The first,
F (X ∩ Y ) ⊇ F (X) ∩ Y, (I-d)
ensures 5(d). It expresses the idea that
our standards of perfection can only be relaxed, not strengthened,
when moving to a more restricted context.
The second,
F (X ∩ Y ) = F (X) ∩ Y whenever F (X) ∩ Y 6= ∅, (I-e)
is a weakening of 5(e). It expresses the idea that
standards of perfection should only be relaxed when absolutely nec-
essary.
The Prisoners’ Dilemma will serve to explain these conditions. There, four
worlds are possible, depending on whether we and our fellow prisoner defect
or not. Assuming we are completely selfish, these worlds are each given
a numerical score, namely the number of units of time we must spend in
prison. Among the possible contexts are “we and our fellow prisoner do
